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BAL ZS SZ¨LINGER, Szegedi TudomÀnyegyetem ߃  
RadnÒti MiklÒs KisÈrleti GimnÀzium 
Introduction 
The Italo߃Ethiopian war was one of the most significant international events 
between the two World Wars. The Italo߃Ethiopian conflict also had further 
parallel dimensions. Though Mussolini hoped that he would gain the support 
of France and perhaps of Great Britain, only the former however assured the 
ߋDuceߌ of her help through the French Minister of Foreign Affaires (Pierre 
Laval). However, the British government, after initial hesitation, decided to 
stand sharply against the action. 
The League of Nations was also ߇forced߈ to deal with the issue because of 
the protests of not only the Ethiopians but others, too. The League decided 
to institute commercial sanctions against Italy from October 9, 1935. These 
sanctions did not concern oil and steel exchange, although Italy߈s East-
African operations could have been paralyzed only with the prohibition of 
these two products. This is the reason for the issue of ߇oil sanctions߈ in the 
League of Nations from the beginning of 1936 and, though they were never 
introduced, they served as a motivation for more aggressive behaviour by 
the Italian dictator. 
In Mussolini߈s opinion Italy߈s position was strong enough to blackmail the 
League with a threat to resign since this would have led to the total collapse of 
collective international security. But Great Britain was unconvinced, so the 
Italian dictator had to find other political means to corner the island. The 
critical point of the British was Egypt and aware of this, the ߋDuceߌ was able 
to threaten them subtly with possible attack on their African treasure. Wheth-
er his plan was serious or not, both of the countries, England and Egypt, pon-
dered the possibility of a coming war. Not only was Egypt at stake for Great 
Britain but also the Mediterranean route leading to India. 
For Hungary the years of 1935߃1936 were significant, too. Surrounded by 
the hostile Little Entente, it had not found a way out from isolation after the 
First World War until 1927, when the Italian߃Hungarian agreement of friend-
ship was signed. The treaty was undoubtedly a great diplomatic success for 
Count IstvÀn (Stephen) Bethlen (Prime Minister between 1921߃1931), since a 
victorious power of World War I seemed to be harmonizing its foreign ambi-
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tions with Hungary. During the ItaloEthiopian conflict the Hungarian 
Prime Minister was Gyula GÕmbÕs (19321936) who was an admirer of Mus-
solini and his fascism.1 But the Italo߃Ethiopian conflict was one of those im-
portant events which proved that Italy as a Great Power existed only in fascist 
minds ߃ indeed, they were not able to act successfully on the different stages 
of the world.2 From this, of course, many drew the right conclusion. 
The Italo߃Ethiopian discord is a classic example how different and dis-
tant geopolitical regions can act on each other߈s future and fate. In this case, 
in my opinion, Italy߈s war in Ethiopia and its global aftermath made a cru-
cial impact on Hungarian foreign policy, determining Hungary߈s future 
policy in World War II and after. Naturally, it did not work without trans-
mission ߃ without the League of Nations and its engine, Great Britain. 
Hungary was touched on her sore spot when sanctions were instituted 
against her only ally, Italy. Though the Hungarian political leadership tried 
to support Italy߈s policy, they found the African adventure quite harmful 
from the Hungarian point of view.3 As the war continued, it became clearer 
and clearer that the operations had tied down nearly all of the Italian mili-
tary forces, thus practically creating a power vacuum in Central Europe 
which would obviously be filled by Germany. The increasing influence of 
the Germans was tantamount to the Anschluss. Until the Italo߃Ethiopian 
war Mussolini was Austria߈s guardian angel, for example when in 1934 at 
the Brenner pass Italy prevented the German invasion of Austria. This 
event represents well the then cloudy German߃Italian relationship, since the 
ߋDuceߌ thought that Hitler wanted Austria to gain a rival position toward 
the Balkans. Until 1936 the Italian dictator did not want German vicinity as 
Hungarians did.4 
 
1 See the best up to date monograph about GÕmbÕs: GERGELY JENµ, GÕmbÕs Gyula. 
Politikai pÀlyakÈp (Budapest 2001). See the English translation of the titles in the bib-
liography! GÕmbÕs was often called by the Hungarian political opposition a 
ߋGÕmbÕliniߌ. 
2 PAUL KENNEDY, A nagyhatalmak tÛndÕklÈse Ès bukÀsa (Budapest 1992), 275281. 
3 Goebbels, for example, wrote the following into his diary on October 1st, 1935: ߋI list 
for him [GÕmbÕs] our anxities about Italy. He partly shares them. In his opinion, there 
would have been three more years for the Abyssinian question.ߌ In: JOSEPH GµBBELS, 
NaplÒ (Budapest 1994), 109. GÕmbÕs߈s anxiety about Italy߈s preparations in Africa: 
R¨TI GYµRGY, BudapestRÒma Berlin ÀrnyÈkÀban (Budapest 1998), 6465. 
4 Though nowadays Italian fascism and German National Socialism are often thought to 
be the same (and sometimes they are even mixed with each other, e.g. when someone 
talks about the German fascism), we have to see clearly that even the people of the period 
realized the differences between them. This of course means that there were many people 
who rejected Hitler but at the same time were enthusiastic about Mussolini߈s Italy. As 
the noted Hungarian writer GyÕzÕ HatÀr wrote: ߋFascism then was not yet that chimera 
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One of the problematic points is the question of the increasing German 
influence in Hungary and how it managed to tone in with the already exist-
ing Italian orientation of the country.5 Focusing on this question, a number 
of studies start from the fact that Gyula GÕmbÕs (Prime Minister between 
1932߃1936) had been urging the German߃Italian rapprochement from the 
beginning of the twenties. Many researchers have concluded that GÕmbÕs 
had actively taken part in the realization of this relationship during his four-
years as Prime Minister.6 It is, however, obviously absurd to suggest that 
Hungarian foreign policy took the German߃Italian alliance as a basis from 
1935, or even earlier since it was realized only later on, after GÕmbÕs߈s 
death. Still, it is not impossible that the Hungarian leadership counted with 
this possibility.  
GÕmbÕs entitled his politics ߇reÀlpolitika߈ (a loan translation of German 
Realpolitik). Whatever he meant by this term, the fact is that for the 1920s 
the desire for the revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty (1920) was both a 
political and an emotional imperative. The loss of two-thirds of the ߋThou-
sand Years Oldߌ Hungary took a heavy toll on almost all of the Magyars 
either emotionally and/or financially. Without undertaking the revision as 
their official policy neither of the governments of the era would have avoid-
ed the anger of public opinion and, with that, their fall.  
Two ways of revision were theoretically possible for Hungary. The first 
one was the peaceful solution, which would have enabled the re-arrangements 
 
[nightmare] that you think of today; in certain circles it was ߇chic߈ and was presentable.ߌ 
In: HAT R GYµZµ, ¨letÙt (Budapest 1993) 7778. 
5 In Hungarian historiography this question was last summarized by Dorottya LiptÀk 
in 1976. On the basis of this work we can mention Elek Karsai߈s opinion, who points 
out that 1933 was the turning point in Hungarian foreign orientation on the founda-
tions of GÕmbÕs߈s visit to Hitler. IvÀn Berend T. thinks that not the first but the se-
cond visit of the same Prime Minister was the touchstone in September 1935. Magda 
 dÀm maintains, and so do I (see cection III.), that in this question we have to start 
from autumn 1936 when the Italians were hesitating over the Yugoslavian attack but 
Hungary was already opposed to the plan because of the partner relationship with 
Germany. And finally, PÀl Pritz prefers November 1937 when KÀlmÀn DarÀnyi (then 
Prime Minister of Hungary) visited Berlin. In: LIPT K DOROTTYA, A GÕmbÕs-
kormÀny kÛlpolitikÀjÀnak egyes kÈrdÈsei a magyar tÕrtÈneti irodalom tÛkrÈben = Acta 
Historica, Tomus LV (University of Szeged, 1976), 6263. 
6 The best known statement is in GyÕrgy RÀnki߈s work from 1983: ߋGÕmbÕs was the first 
statesman who had visited Hitler. The German orientation, thus, became the main mo-
tive of Hungarian foreign policy.ߌ R NKI GYµRGY, MozgÀsterek, kÈnyszerpÀlyÀk 
(Budapest 1983) 490. This statement cannot be true because of the simple fact that in 
1933, at the time of the first visit, the Italian alliance was too precious to give up for the 
German one. 
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under the aegis of the League of Nations. The basis for this concept lay in 
Article 19 of the Covenant, which, in theory, gave a possibility for changes of 
borders in case they were well reasoned and served the preservation of peace. 
The second was the military ߇solution߈ of the problem, naturally not only 
relying on Hungary߈s own resources but together with either of her strong 
allies. Considering Hungary߈s disarmed position according to the Trianon 
Treaty, the Hungarian politicians favoured the peaceful way. The main media-
tor of the peaceful revision was Baron Pompeo Aloisi, an internationally re-
spected politician (Italy߈s permanent representative in the League), who de-
fended the Italian viewpoint many times in the conference halls in Geneva 
during the Italo߃Ethiopian conflict. However, he was the same person, who 
ߋefficiently stood by the truth of the Hungarians before the League of Na-
tions any time.ߌ7 
In the light of this, it is comprehensible what a mess was made in the 
minds of Hungarian politicians during the African aggression of Italy. It 
was a moral dilemma for them since their supporters wanted to defend the 
߇Hungarian truth߈ while committing an obvious injustice somewhere else in 
the world.  
The issue involved serious practical matters and dangers such as threat-
ening of Italy with dismissal from the League. In this case Hungary should 
have chosen between her only backer and the League of Nations. Finally, 
the choice was manifested in the question of the sanctions introduced 
against Italy. Hungarian foreign policy tried to find a neutral standpoint in 
the question but at the time it was impossible.  
2. From the Wal߃Wal Incident to the Question of the Sanctions 
The Hungarian politicians working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
regularly informed about the coming of the Italo߃Ethiopian conflict after 
the Wal-Wal incident.8 In Hungary the leftist newspaper NÈpszava (Voice 
of the People) was the first to cover the skirmish of December 5, 1934, three 
days after the event. From this time on the press regularly reported the mat-
ter. However, in the beginning they did not see more than a ߇usual߈ colonial 
affray. 
Towards the end of December Pierre Laval, the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and his forthcoming visit to Italy received the attention of the Hungar-
ian newspapers. The cause of this growing interest can be found in the Hun-
 
7 Lexical article of Aloisi, in: A Pesti HÌrlap Lexikona 1937. 
8 ORMOS M RIA, HÀborÙ EtiÒpia fÕldjÈn (Budapest 1970), 45. This work is still the only 
monograph in Hungary about the ItaloEthiopian war and the international dispute. 
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garian antipathy towards the approach of Italy and France.9 Laval arrived in 
Rome on January 4, 1935 with two main goals. The first was to come to an 
agreement in the case of Central European security seeking the guarantee of 
Austria߈s independence by both states. The other question focused on the 
colonial claims of Italy.10 Both countries seemed to be quite content with the 
results of the negotiations, namely, with the Danubian Pact11 and also Italy߈s 
colonial claims were satisfied by certain compensations in Africa. However, 
this last point, which became public from the agreement, said hardly any-
thing.12 It is obvious that the secret part of the treaty contained more signifi-
cant provisions. Considering this Laval߈s behaviour was contradictory: he 
denied that he had ߇approved߈ the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, but in the scope 
of later events, we can suppose that he did so.13 Baron Frigyes Villani, Hun-
garian minister in Rome, sent the following message to KÀlmÀn KÀnya, Hun-
garian Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 12, 1935: 
News that Italy wants to control Abyssinia became frequent lately and 
even the public deals with it. I would not say that the masses sympa-
thize with this risky business. A few days ago I had a chat with the 
chief editor of one of the biggest Roman newspapers, who claimed that 
if the ߋDuceߌ gives the order >to attack] there will be no disobedience. 
 
 9 The Hungarian liberal opposition, however, took to the FrenchItalian approach 
because they thought Hungary could attain her goals in Paris through Rome. 
GÕmbÕs, on the other hand hoped the same but he wanted to get to Berlin through 
Rome. (L. NAGY ZSUZSANNA, A fasizmus, ahogyan a magyar liberÀlis ellenzÈk lÀtta = 
TÕrtÈnelmi Szemle, vol. 12 (1969), 227. 
10 As it is well-known, Italy decided to stand by the Entente in 1915 because of the 
above mentioned conditions. But by the end of the war they practically had to leave 
empty handed.  
11 The plan outlined a Central European collective security system (with Hungary, its 
neighbouring countries, Germany and Italy) which would have ensured the status quo. 
Hungary, however, rejected the plan. See JUH SZ GYULA, MagyarorszÀg kÛlpolitikÀja, 
19191945 (Budapest 1988) 152155. 
12 It covered only a few square kilometres in Libya and 20 % of the shares of the Addis 
AbabaDjibuti railroad. Though the majority of the shares belonged to Ethiopia, it 
was more significant then the land itself. 
13 Later Laval wrote these lines in his diary: ߋIn connection with Ethiopia I tried to 
convince Mussolini not to use force. >ߑ@ He started into the war against my will and 
my explicit protest.ߌ In: Unpublished Diary of Pierre Laval (London 1948), 34. The 
secret part of the agreement was discussed by Askew (1961), and a complete analysis 
of the whole matter by GEORGE W. BAER, The Coming of the ItaloEthiopian War 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts 1967), 6295. 
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But in general, nobody relies on the success of the adventure unless 
there exist such agreements which are not known by the outsiders.14 
Two weeks later the journalist of the right wing newspaper, Nemzeti UjsÀg 
(National Newspaper), wrote about the Italian plans as already decided facts: 
The price of the European agreements is in Africa. We can only wish, 
with bald egotism, that Italy߈s colonial desires and vital interests 
would be satisfied. >ߑ@ Thus the most important Italian problem 
now is the question of expansion or explosion ߃ it can be solved only 
with the move towards the right direction. And this would serve the 
undeveloped Ethiopians, too.15 
Almost the whole Hungarian press was on the side of the Italians from 
the beginning to the end of the conflict.16 Even the left wing NÈpszava 
(People߈s Voice) and Szocializmus (Socialism) came to a standstill with the 
scourge of imperialism and were philosophizing over the possibilities of the 
settlement of the ߋworker surplusߌ in the colonies.17 There were only rare 
exceptions, for example, in the Nemzeti UjsÀg in which an anonymous au-
thor refers to the colonalization as an ߍinjurious attemptߌ.18  
The leaders of Hungarian foreign policy sized up precisely that a possible 
lasting Italian activity in Ethiopia would throw Central Europe off balance 
and the new situation would result in a German߃Italian rapprochement. In 
a letter that GÕmbÕs sent to the Italian dictator on 11th March 1935, he asks 
serious questions about the international situation. It is clear from this text, 
that GÕmbÕs had doubts about Italy߈s plans in Africa: ߋperhaps the French 
will be happy if Italy will be involved in an adventure far beyond its power, 
with the aim that they [French] may get a free hand in Europe? Perhaps the 
Abyssinian army is stronger than it seems?ߌ It is obvious from the whole 
 
14 OL K»M K99 10/pol1935. The full forms of acronyms of the archival sources are at 
the end of this article, see Abbreviations. 
15 GESZTI LAJOS, AbisszÌnia OlaszorszÀgÈ lesz = Nemzeti UjsÀg, January 27th, 1935. 
16 The only exception among the Hungarian periodicals was the monthly Huszadik 
SzÀzad (߇Twentieth Century߈), a radical liberal journal. 
17 ASCHER L SZL², Abesszinia sorsa = Szocializmus (1935), 417419.  
18 N.A., JapÀn AfrikÀban = Nemzeti UjsÀg (July 21st, 1935). Hungarian journalism was 
censored in this era even if not totally. In the case of the ItaloEthiopian conflict it was 
Mussolini߈s request to the Hungarian government to try and steer the press into a pro-
Italian direction. The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs assured the ߍDuceߌ that the 
Hungarian press would work exclusively from Italian sources. Report of Colonna (Ital-
ian ambassador to Budapest) to Mussolini. Budapest, June 4, 1935. In: R¨TI GYµRGY (ed. 
and transl.), A Palazzo Chigi Ès MagyarorszÀg (= PChM) (Budapest 2003), 318. 
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letter that GÕmbÕs found the double role of Italy (i.e. in Europe and in 
Africa) impossible.19  
Mussolini answered more than a week later:  
In the Abyssinian question the events prosper absolutely normally ߃ 
without rashness or intervention of any other power. The question of 
Abyssinia is ߃ especially after the events of the last months and the 
difficult situation ߃ primarily the problem of our Eastern African 
colonies߈ political and military security. Thus our aim is to create a 
clear situation and absolute calm.  
Concerning the European reactions of the accidental Italian action in 
Africa, that Your Excellency pointed to, I want to reassure Your Ex-
cellency that our completed security measures in our Eastern African 
Colonies have not reduced the military power of the motherland, nei-
ther in its frames nor financially, and it will not be reduced in the fu-
ture. My decisive aim is to be ready in Europe for every emergency.20  
Later Mussolini reassured GÕmbÕs that Hungary could still count on 
Italy߈s unconditional friendship. As regards GÕmbÕs he would have fa-
voured only one ߍemergencyߌ: if the Ethiopian action would have brought 
Italy and Germany closer to each other. However the rest of the letter dis-
appointed him, because Mussolini was pessimistic about future Italian߃
German relations.21 In April there were unquestionable signs of the chang-
ing relationship between Italy and Hungary. The absolute orientation to-
wards Italy was revised. Mackensen, the German minister in Budapest re-
ported the following to Berlin on April 6: ߋThe governor [MiklÒs Horthy] 
and the Prime Minister [Gyula GÕmbÕs] do not see more in their friendship 
with Italy but an unavoidable set-up due to the recent situation which how-
ever will not stand forever.ߌ22 
Three days later Hungarian sources mentioned the transitional deteriora-
tion of Hungarian߃Italian connections. The cause of the loosening relation-
ship was distrust because of the Laval߃Mussolini negotiations and also the 
ever-developing German߃Hungarian economic relations. KÀnya in the Of-
fice of Foreign Affairs received this report from the Hungarian consul gen-
eral in Milan: 
 
19 GÕmbÕs Mussolininek, 1935. mÀrcius 11. In: PChM 285. 
20 Mussolini GÕmbÕsnek, 1935. mÀrcius 23. In: PChM 288. 
21 Ibid. 289. 
22 Mackensen߈s report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affaires. In: R NKI GYµRGY etc. 
(eds.), A Wilhelmstrasse Ès MagyarorszÀg, 19331944 (= WsM) (Budapest 1968), 140. 
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>Mussolini@ emphasized [that] the French߃Italian agreement is also a 
great step further for Hungarian hopes. The watchdogs on Trianon߈s 
grave, the Little Entente had to be removed first in order to pull Hun-
gary through. >ߑ@ But now the Little Entente is not that significant in 
the eyes of France as it was in the past. Today Rome߈s word is crucial in 
the Danube-question.ߌ However the consul adds: ߋPro-Hungarian Ital-
ians here have been anxiously asking me whether Hungary would give 
up the politics of her absolute Italian orientation. Of course, I try to 
dispel these doubts whenever it is possible showing >ߑ@ that the rap-
prochement towards Germany is only based on economic interests be-
cause Hungary badly needs the German export market. >ߑ@ I feel that 
these doubts over our friendship have deep roots.23 
It is clear, therefore, that the basis of the change in the Italian߃Hungarian 
relationship was mutual distrust. Hungarian foreign policy was not sure at 
all of the fact that the Italians simply ߇inherited߈ France߈s influence in Cen-
tral Europe. Their doubts were right, however, this quotation serves as a 
new proof of the German߃Italian opposition, which was quite strong in that 
period (first half of 1935).24 In the introduction I have already referred to 
the opinion of Hungarian politicians, who objected to closer diplomatic 
relations with Germany. But from an economic point of view, Hungary was 
dependent on the German market.25 While economic relations had been 
built between the two countries, closer political connections were rejected 
by the ministry of foreign affairs and also the general staff for many rea-
sons.26 Vilmos RÕder, the head of the Hungarian general staff, tried to con-
 
23 OL K»M K99 7/biz.35 1935߃2. 
24 On the basis of MÀria Ormos߈s research we can state that the Hungarians did not think 
the Danubian Pact to be realistic, and on the other hand, they wanted territorial results in 
the question of the Revision. Everything that promised less than this was regarded as 
misleading. ORMOS M RIA, FranciaorszÀg Ès a keleti biztonsÀg (Budapest 1969), 353߃354. 
25 See R NKI GYµRGY, GazdasÀg Ès kÛlpolitika (Budapest 1981), 256߃257. 
26 The memoir of the general staff from December 1935 serves as proof of this. The 
document states that: ߋItaly does not feel desirable the vicinity of the German Empire 
with 70 million people.ߌ In: HET¨S TIBOR and MORVA TAM SN¨ (eds.), Csak szolgÀ-
lati hasznÀlatra! Iratok a Horthy hadsereg tÕrtÈnetÈhez (= IHht) (Budapest 1968), 
352. If they thought these things in December, it had surely been the situation half a 
year before when Italy had had her total military potential on the Continent. The 
viewpoint of the GÕmbÕs government is well-represented from an official publication 
in which is summarized the formation of Hungarian foreign connections between 
1932߃1935. It is worth looking at the phrases used. In the opinion of the authors the 
relationship with Italy is ߋintimateߌ, with Austria and Turkey it is ߋfriendlyߌand with 
England and France it is ߋcordialߌ. On the other side, the connections with Germany 
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vince the Italian military leaders of this. He instructed the Hungarian mili-
tary attachÈ in Rome, LÀszlÒ SzabÒ as follows: 
Go to Baistrocchi27 and Pariani28 and deliver the following message 
of mine, which has been approved by the head of the Hungarian gov-
ernment and the ministry of foreign affairs.  
1. Hungary will never be ungrateful to Italy and will not turn those 
weapons against the Italians that were given by the Italians.  
2. On the part of Hungary, military or any other kind of information 
given by the Italians, will not be transmitted neither directly nor indi-
rectly to Germany or anybody else. >ߑ@  
3. It was never stated that Hungary would take part in an anti߃Italian 
block with Germany.  
4. In our opinion the Germans and the Italians mutually misunder-
stand each other. The Germans believe that Italy wants the Danube ߃ 
the Italians believe that Germany wants the Brenner border. >ߑ@ If 
these misunderstandings cannot be eliminated it is to be feared that 
the Little Entente will fall totally into Germany߈s hands. In case of a 
mutual comprehension not only would Hungary be liberated from 
the German pressure but also the friendship of the nations would 
come to life.29 
For Hungary, it was not advisable to accept an open German orientation 
since at the Stresa Conference Italy showed her anti߃German stance again. 
The conference opened on April 11, 1935 with the participation of France, 
Great Britain and Italy. The original aim of the meeting was to demonstrate a 
united front of the Great Powers against Germany, which had declared its re-
militarization in March. The conference would have been a suitable occasion 
for England to make clear the colonial plans of Mussolini. The English delega-
tion, however, remained silent and their presence at the conference was disin-
genuous since the secret negotiations about the fleet agreement between Brit-
ain and Germany had been in progress for four months.30 Silence gives con-
 
and the Soviet Union are without qualification. In: A GÕmbÕs-kormÀny hÀrom 
esztendÕs munkÀssÀga, 1932߃1935 (Budapest 1935). 
27 Italian under secretary in the Ministry of War. 
28 The Italian Minister of War. 
29 IHht 341߃343. 
30 H. HARASZTI ¨VA, BÈkÈltetÕk. A brit kÛlpolitika az 1930-as Èvekben (Budapest 1981), 
35. The agreement was signed on June 18th, 1935. We know from Churchill that an un-
fortunate accident has greatly influenced the English silence at Stresa. The most pro-
minant participant of the conference would have been Simon, Minister of Foreign Af-
faires who would have been accompanied by Antony Eden. Eden, however, had a 
nervous breakdown and could not be present at the meeting. Churchill felt sorry for 
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sent and Mussolini took the silence as a ߋyesߌ to his plans, thus there had 
been no obstacle to sign the anti߃German final act. 
The Stresa declaration of the three Great Powers made the German߃
Italian relationship only worse. Though Mussolini kept on stressing that the 
African operations would not weaken Italy߈s European presence, the ߋDu-
ceߌ obviously knew that he had to moderate his hostile politics towards 
Germany, at least during the war. June 1935 brought a crucial turn in the 
German߃Italian connections. Towards the end of May news was brought to 
Hungary about the long awaited improvement. An unknown author wrote 
that ߋin the Berlin diplomatic circle an opinion is spreading, in connection 
with the question of Abyssinia, that now Italy is the one who looks for 
support in Germany and in return Italy would be compliant about the ques-
tion of Austria.ߌ31 The affirmation from the Hungarian embassy in Rome 
arrived in Budapest within a week: 
The German-Italian connection shows really a pleasing improvement. 
>ߑ@ The Italian newspapers, because of the orders from above, avoid 
all kinds of attack [against Germany] in the last few days and the 
German press welcomes the Italian operations in Abyssinia so much 
that it seems to engage in polemic even with the English, too. About 
this German approach Suvich32 said appreciative words to me stress-
ing that the ߋDuceߌ, who regards this question as the touchstone of 
the foreign powers, is very satisfied with the behaviour of Berlin. >ߑ@ 
Hassell33 added to this funnily that the negus deserves a statue in Ber-
lin because he is the one who can be thanked for the rapprochement 
between Germany and Italy, which earlier seemed to be totally im-
possible. >ߑ@ In all, I can state that the question of the Anschluss, 
which got in the focus of the Italian foreign policy, became only the 
second after the question of Ethiopia.34 
 
him because Eden would have surely raised the question of Ethiopia; WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL, A mÀsodik vilÀghÀborÙ (Budapest 1989), 5253. On the other hand there 
is certain information that, though not formally but within the frames of private con-
versations, the problem has arisen. Vansittart, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
is said to have dissuaded the Italians from their African plans; ORMOS (1970), 50. Ac-
cording to the Hungarian Minister to the Holy See, Barcza, even Montgomery had 
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31 OL K»M K99 88/pol߃1935 (June 8th, 1935). 
32 The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
33 The German ambassador in Rome. 
34 OL K»M K99 88/pol1935 (June 8th, 1935). 
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It is a further question, however, whether the rapprochement of the two 
countries was inevitable or not, and so it is worth examining their motivations 
in brief. In the case of Italy, Mussolini probably knew that while there were 
operations in Africa, Italy would not be able to defend her interests in Europe 
concerning Austria. But did Mussolini really want to stand by Austria? As we 
know that the ߋDuceߌ planned a lightning war in Ethiopia, in the middle of 
1935 he could have thought that he would be able to protect his positions in 
Central Europe and regard the German rapprochement as only transitionary.35 
The motivations of Germany are not so easy to understand. It seems prob-
able that Hitler realized that Italy would have to choose between Ethiopia 
and the protection of Austria, thus a lasting conflict could ease the German 
dictator߈s fait accompli politics. Many signs indicate that the German leader 
was playing a dual game: on one hand he approached Italy, and on the other 
Germany sold arms to Ethiopia!36 Hitler had felt that it was worth supporting 
Italy (even by transitional guarantees about Austria) since Mussolini had em-
barked upon the ߋredistribution of the worldߌ.37 At the same time, since the 
African war seemed unavoidable, the previous politics of Germany (to stam-
pede Italy into a war) was useful; so they could initiate friendlier politics 
without any risk. 
3. The Sanctions 
The question of sanctions was the problem, which made the Italo߃
Ethiopian conflict global and also struck Hungary to the quick because of 
her friendly relations with Italy. From August, 1935 there had already been 
ambiguous signs that the League of Nations would condemn Italy mainly 
because of British pressure. On the other hand, it was quite evident that 
Italy would start the war at all costs.38  
 
35 Ibid. This assumption is confirmed by the French-Italian agreement on the withdrawal 
of the troops stationed at the common border. These Italian military units were led to 
the Austrian border. On the other hand, France߈s standpoint was ambiguous since 
they signed a treaty with the British in which the French allowed London the use of 
the military ports of Toulon and Bizerta. Thus, in other words, the French were seem-
ingly forced to use double-dealing politics. ORMOS (1969) 391. 
36 Simultaneously there was an unusual friendly reception of the new Italian ambassador 
to Berlin (Attolico) and the shipment of arms worth 1.2 million marks to Ethiopia via 
Norway and Belgium! See BAER 226. (footnote 45) and 319320. 
37 KISS ALAD R, Az olasz fasizmus tÕrtÈnete (Budapest 1970) 229230. Germany tried 
to entrap Ethiopia and Italy into war even earlier (at the end of 1934), when a German 
agent, Steffen has ߋadvised the Emperor to attack before the preparations of the ene-
my were completeߌ. BAIRU TAFLA, Ethiopia and Germany. Cultural, political and 
economic relations, 18711936 (Wiesbaden 1981), 141142. 
38 BAER 244303. 
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There is no sign of any activity regarding the Italo-Ethiopian dispute in 
Hungarian politics until August 1935. The first debate of the Hungarian 
government about this matter was on 6th of August at the usual council of 
ministers. Discussing the possibility that the European impact of the con-
flict could affect Hungary too, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, KÀnya, stat-
ed that if the nations would have to take a stand in Geneva, it would not be 
absolutely crucial for Hungary to stand up for Mussolini.39 The reactions of 
the Prime Minister (GÕmbÕs) or his colleagues are unknown, although 
there was an early sign of their evolving dissent. 
The Italian attack in Ethiopia started on October 3, 1935. The Hungarian 
minister in Rome, Villani, reported on this by phone early in the morning 
and later on he also sent his official written account.40 In his report he had 
dealt with the question of the prospective sanctions and he suggested that 
Hungary would be exempt from voting because of its disarmed status.41 
The Hungarian newspapers, without exception, reported on the military 
events in Ethiopia regularly and in detail. 
The Committee of Thirteen of the League of Nations, which was dealing 
with the Italo߃Ethiopian conflict on October 5, decided that Italy had no 
right to choose military intervention in Africa. Two days later it concluded 
with the new establishment of the Committee of Six declaring that Italy had 
committed an act of aggression and had urging economic sanctions in its 
recommendations.42 A general assembly was called to debate the issue. 
In this situation the expulsion of Italy from the League of Nations arose 
as an alternative. There are certain signs suggesting that Italian diplomats in 
Budapest asked the Hungarian Prime Minister whether Hungary would 
also have left if Italy had done so.43 GÕmbÕs gave an evasive answer and 
KÀnya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had promised that Hungary would 
vote against the sanctions, but rejected following Italy߈s conditional with-
 
39 GERGELY JENµ (ed.), Antal IstvÀn sajtÒfÕnÕk emlÈkiratai (Budapest 2003), 424. Antal 
IstvÀn was the main public relations officer during the GÕmbÕs-government. 
40 OL K»M K99 153/pol1935. 
41 OL K»M K99 152/pol1935. 
42 We have to make a distiction between two different votes. The first one was held on 
October 7, 1935 and the question it had to answer was whether Italy was guilty or not 
in the WalWal incident. Most of the members voted yes except for Hungary. Two 
days later a more significant vote was held when they decided about Italy߈s responsi-
bility, whether the country had behaved as an aggressor or not. Part of the relevant 
bibliography mixes these two events; see ߋReport of the League of Nations Council 
Committeeߌ, in: The American Journal of International Law, ser. 30, 1. Supplement: 
Official Documents (January 1936), 3740. 
43 R¨TI (1998) 7172. 
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drawal from the League.44 It is known that from the beginning of Septem-
ber the Italian diplomacy in Budapest was working hard just to learn the 
Hungarian standpoint. Moreover, Mussolini directed Colonna (Italian am-
bassador to Budapest) to announce to the Hungarian Prime Minister that 
Italy expected Hungary߈s negative vote in the question of the sanctions.45 
But the decision was reached by the Hungarian diplomats after a long de-
bate. The reason for this is in the different opinions of the Hungarian lead-
ers: MiklÒs Horthy (Regent of Hungary, 19201944), Gyula GÕmbÕs 
(Prime Minister, 19321936), KÀlmÀn KÀnya (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
19331938). As we will see later, during the two world wars it was almost 
impossible to discuss foreign policy matters in the Hungarian parliament or 
even in the Committee of Foreign Affairs. It was merely the privilege of the 
three statesmen mentioned.46  
KÀlmÀn KÀnya reacted sensitively to the British viewpoint. In September 
he thought that Hungary could only say ߋnoߌ to the sanctions because of her 
Italian orientation. But after conversations with British diplomats he became 
convinced that despite these feelings, Hungary should say ߋyesߌ to the sanc-
tions!47 Following this, between October 3 and 7 (the exact date is unknown) 
at a council of ministers he made this new proposal to the Prime Minister but 
he could not manage to convince GÕmbÕs of his viewpoint. What is more, 
GÕmbÕs shouted at KÀnya that ߋI would rather cut off my hands than sign 
such a decisionߌ.48 KÀnya and GÕmbÕs, thus, had to go to the Regent, MiklÒs 
Horthy. We have no detailed account of this audience but it seems to be sure 
that this was the first time that KÀnya had threatened his resignation.49 There 
are no documents about what happened at the audience between Horthy, 
GÕmbÕs and KÀnya, but presumably Horthy managed to make a compro-
mise. We know Horthy߈s then standpoint from the report of the Italian am-
bassador in Budapest: 
 
44 ORMOS (1970) 102103. 
45 Mussolini߈s telegram to Colonna. October 7, 1935. PChM 342. 
46 PRITZ P L, ߋDÕntÈsi folyamatok a magyar kÛlpolitikÀban 19191944ߌ, In: PRITZ P L, A 
magyar diplomÀcia a kÈt vilÀghÀborÙ kÕzÕtt. TanulmÀnyok (Budapest 1995), 225233. 
47 One of the ߋdiplomatsߌ was C.A. Macartney, then English professor in Hungary, 
author of many books on Hungarian history. 
48 Memoirs of Antal IstvÀn (manuscript in the Hungarian Academy of Science). Quoted 
in: R¨TI (1998) 71. 
49 PRITZ (1982) 234235. To get a full picture we have to add that KÀnya had already 
criticised the Italians before that since in his opinion the Ethiopian operation had not 
been prepared through diplomacy. Ibid. 233234. GÕmbÕs and KÀnya had been in a 
tense relationship from May when they were opposed to each other over the question 
of the future Berlin minister. 
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The Governor, with whom two days ago I spent the afternoon at the 
GÕdÕllÕ mansion, spontaneously and most cordially expressed his 
accordance to the Italian attitude in the Ethiopian question.  
He said that he absolutely understands the necessity of Italian expansion 
and the action planned by Your Excellency. Conversely he does not un-
derstand Great Britain߈s viewpoint and especially why she does not 
identify herself with a civilised great power that is against a ߇coloured 
barbarism߈. (sic! These are obviously Horthy߈s own words ߃ Sz. B.) In 
his opinion it will be obvious after the defeat of the Negus, that opposi-
tion will be in vain and they [Ethiopians] will be ߇satisfied߈ with nominal 
sovereignty, similar to that which the Sultan of Morocco was given by 
the French authorities. Nevertheless his confidence is that it was the 
best possible decision of Your Excellency to go ahead without taking 
into consideration England߈s opposition.50  
The Italian diplomat, Colonna, later added that other Hungarian politi-
cians had begun to think the same way, and had overcome their early an-
guish (perhaps even KÀnya did so). The cause of this  as Colonna wrote  
was ߍthe real and sincere hope that the present international situation will 
lead to the rapprochement and co-operation of Italy and Germany.ߌ51 We 
have another source for Horthy߈s opinion, albeit it from his memoirs, writ-
ten after WW II. Here he writes more moderately: 
When these democracies reached for so߃called sanctions because of 
the East African plans of Italy, they chased Germany and Italy into 
each other߈s arms. (ߑ) We had no reasons to join these senseless 
sanctions. With this, of course, we got a bad mark from Eden.52 
According to the above quotations we conclude that Hungary߈s absten-
tion from any sanction was the result of Horthy߈s compromise. In this case 
the decision was actually equal to the rejection of the sanctions, which 
meant that GÕmbÕs was pleased with this solution (probably his point of 
view was shared by Horthy, too) and KÀnya did not have to resign.  
 The hesitation in the question of the sanctions was made worse by another 
factor. The Hungarian standpoint (abstention) was introduced by Baron 
LÀszlÒ Velics, the Hungarian representative at the League of Nations at the 
meeting in Geneva on October 9, 1935. But in the Hungarian National Ar-
chives, I found three versions of the speech. Keeping the chronology and fol-
lowing the mechanism of the Hungarian diplomacy, the first version was the 
 
50 Colonna to Mussolini. 28th August, 1935. PChM 330߃331. 
51 Ibid. 
52 HORTHY MIKL²S, EmlÈkirataim (Budapest 1990), 177. 
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draft which told Velics what he was to say. Most of the time these drafts were 
delivered by a diplomatic courier or, in the case of great urgency, they were 
sent by telegraph. However, in this particular case an irregular and unusual 
process had been used: it was dictated by telephone from Budapest by Baron 
GÀbor Apor (permanent deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and prob-
ably Velics himself noted it down. This fact itself is proof of the late decision 
making by Hungary. As was mentioned, KÀnya informed the Italian diplo-
mats about the decision only on October 8 but it seems that he did so because 
he was not convinced and not because he wanted to keep it secret. As the 
voting was held on October 9, the telephone seemed to be the only solution. 
It is striking, however, that this version contained ߋnoߌ to the question of the 
sanctions!53 The reason for this is not known, and so again we can only guess 
what happened. It seems possible that it was the private action of GÕmbÕs 
(and not Apor supposedly), who tried to hinder the decision at the last minute 
because of his fears of losing the Italian friendship (he might have consulted 
with Italian diplomats, too).54  
The second version of the speech is almost identical with the first, only 
some lines were re-written by Velics (the decision itself has not been 
changed). This means that there were perhaps hours, when the text of the 
Hungarian decision was already in Geneva, with a ߋnoߌ at the end. However, 
we don߈t know how the ߋnoߌ was changed again into abstention. The third 
version is the actual speech, which was delivered at the assembly, and on the 
evening of the same day, October 9, was sent back to Budapest by telegraph.55 
The abstention of Hungary from the sanctions was explained as follows: 
Concerning the economic sanctions, Hungary is in an interesting situa-
tion. Many of the resolutions of the League of Nations, which con-
cerned Article 16 of the Covenant, took measures by paying attention 
to the special demands and conditions of each of the countries. It is 
 
53 OL K»M K107 75. Cs. 1028/1935. All three versions of the speech can be found under 
this code. The end of the ߇Apor-version߈ is the following (originally in French): ߋNot 
being in a situation when all the facts and documents, which would reason the adop-
tion of the serious resolutions, could have been examined with close attention and full 
consciousness, my country, following moral principles, votes with no.ߌ 
54 It seemed to be confirmed as Antal recollected badly in his memoirs (manuscript). He 
remembers that GÕmbÕs was the one who dictated the text. Although it is clear from 
the archive documents that it was Apor, Antal߈s bad memory implies GÕmbÕs߈s re-
sponsibility. See: R¨TI (1998) 71. Months later GÕmbÕs stated (to Colonna) that he 
had not even previously read the text! PChM 359. 
55 That is why we do not know the whole of the official text. The Journal Officiel, the 
official publication of the League of Nations, did not publish Velics߈s full speech un-
like other representatives߈ views. 
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possible that the sanctions would cause damage in the participating 
countries, which could cause serious consequences later on. Thus, it 
seems that a certain scope for movement should be left for the states in 
order they could fulfil the aims of the League. There is no one but the 
Council who knows better the financial and economic difficulties of 
Hungary. The exclusion of Italy from the already limited and narrow 
markets would cause the total upset of the Hungarian financial and eco-
nomic balance. This balance was possible only with Italian exports. 
This part of the speech covers the reality. The economic situation of the 
countries in the Danube basin was becoming worse because of the Great De-
pression. Their debts were growing gradually, for instance because of the lack 
of mutual relationships. However, there were two significant commercial 
agreements (the Hungarian߃German and the Hungarian߃Italian߃Austrian 
ones) of which the German one was more important concerning the whole 
Hungarian economy, but Italy remained one of the biggest markets for agri-
cultural products, on which the Hungarian economy was based.56 Further-
more, in Velics߈s speech we can find phrases, which tried to argue by the 
Hungarian߃Italian bonds of friendship and the country߈s revisionist claims:  
A nation߈s life does not exist within rigid, static frames but following 
the disciplines given by nature, it is constantly moving. The basic task 
of the League of Nations is to oversee that this process can happen on 
the basis of regulating terms.  
The declaration of a definite Hungarian standpoint regarding the sanc-
tions was disclaimed by these words:  
I ask the question whether this is the case when those sanctions have 
to be imposed which are to be used in cases of obvious aggression as 
an ultima ratio. It is not the Hungarian government that should give 
an answer to this question.57 
The abstention was practically equal to standing by Italy. Because of this, 
then and later on, Hungary was criticised by the ߋsanctionistߌ states. Samu-
el Hoare telegrammed to Edmond, head of the British delegation to the 
League of Nations, that ߋif it is indeed true that Hungary will take no part 
 
56 R¨TI (1998) 4246. 
57 Hungary thus abstained from the voting together with Austria and Albania. There was 
a legal possibility to do that, though the text of the Covenant was ambigious. Accord-
ing to this, it was compulsory to take part in the sanctions if all the states agreed on 
the guiltiness of the accused country. Contemporary anti-sanctionist explanations are 
MENGELE FERENC, A NÈpszÕvetsÈg jogi Ès politikai rendszere (Budapest 1927), 
258274 and 381382, and FILIPPUCCI-GIUSTINIANI, A szankciÒk joga = KÛlÛgyi 
Szemle ser. 14, 1936, 264276. 
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at all in any kind of League action, she will obviously be a disloyal member 
of the League and will have to bear her full share of the responsibility.ߌ58 
Later on, Sir G. Knox, newly appointed British minister to Budapest was 
ordered to ߋmake very heavy weatherߌ in the Hungarian capital. He dis-
cussed the matter with the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, KÀnya, 
who told him that ߋHungary had no wish to oppose [the League] and had 
many reasons for being gratefulߌ, but Hungary ߋwould run grave economic 
risks by imposing sanctions on Italy.ߌ59 It is undoubtedly true that, since 
export of grain to Italy was forbidden by the sanctions, it would have 
caused a great deficiency in the budget if Hungary had joined the fifty 
countries voting for the sanctions.60 
Mussolini expressed his gratitude to Hungary for its behaviour in the 
League of Nations, at least verbally. On October 11 LÀszlÒ SzabÒ, the 
Hungarian military attachÈ in Rome, visited the ߋDuceߌ on the occasion of 
the regular audience, which we know of from the report he sent to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. According to the attachÈ Mussolini said: 
Please inform His Excellency GµMBµS that I appreciate his best 
wishes especially at this crucial point and I thank him. ߃ Please in-
form the members of the HUNGARIAN ARMY, of whom I have a high 
opinion, that the declaration of their solidarity at the time of the en-
deavour of their Italian comrades serves as new proof of that friendship 
that will lead to the fulfilment of Hungarian claims. [ߑ] I have been 
working for thirty years, asking, begging, threatening legitimately to 
ensure room for the population of Italy [ߑ] ߃ I want these poor masses 
to eat at least once a day because today they eat only once and not 
enough. ߃ What I wanted to produce from this land by bonification, I 
did. ߃ It does not work anymore. There is no place for the Italian 
worker in Tunis; in France and in America the Italian masses do not 
find work. In our colonies we have the first crop from a wretched  
olive߃tree in 15߃20 years if we sacrifice millions. I want land or other-
wise we shall explode. ߃ Thus when I had obtained a free hand from 
LAVAL I acted. ߃ There is no stopping here. ߃ >ߑ@ Nobody who knows 
my claims can accuse me of starting to believe in this principle just to-
day. ߃ I always said that Europe can be saved from extreme danger  
only by just treaties [ߑ] You Hungarians are getting closer to your 
 
58 W.N. MEDICLOTT, etc. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 19191939 (= 
DBFP) (London 1976), 64 (Document No. 54). 
59 Ibid. 65., in the footnote. 
60 It deserves attention that Egypt has also joined the sanctions, though the country was 
not a member of the League. 
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aims with this step because Europe, willy߃nilly, has to find other, 
healthier ways to go on. ߃ You have to feel that I always support you. 
A new horizon opens up to you!61 
The quotation speaks for itself. For us those parts are interesting which 
promise the satisfaction of Hungarian claims. There are certain historical 
sources that refer to the fact that Mussolini had prepared for a quick (if not a 
lightning) war though the general staff called his attention to the possibility of 
a longer war which was also confirmed by Hungarian military analysis.62 It 
was obvious that Mussolini could not fulfil his European promises in these 
circumstances, though he kept on saying that the presence of Italian troops in 
Africa did not influence Italy߈s European military forces. Besides this, in con-
nection with the above quotation, it is worth calling attention to the point that 
the Italian leader again confirmed: he had obtained a ߋfree handߌ from Laval. 
If this statement were not true he would not have a reason to say something 
untrue to the Hungarian military attachÈ. 
There are certain references that suggest also that the Hungarian intelli-
gence service was used by the Italian military leadership to map the British 
military forces in Egypt. The close relationship between the ߋDuceߌ and the 
Hungarian military attachÈ in Rome was more intimate than between Mus-
solini and other diplomats.63 What is more, the Hungarian߃Egyptian con-
nection was quite warm and friendly in these years (even the question of an 
agreement of friendship was once mentioned in the Egyptian press). There 
was also an important group of Hungarians in Egypt, which had significant 
economic interests, too.64 Thus, if Mussolini wanted to complete the infor-
mation given by the Italian spies ߃ who were obviously followed by an 
ߋarmyߌ of secret agents ߃ he could use the Hungarian connections.  
As it was mentioned before, the Western countries together with nations 
of the Little Entente criticised Hungary because of the abstentions. This 
was the cause for further explanations by important personalities of Hun-
garian public life. Following Velics߈s speech at the meeting in Geneva, 
Ferenc Herczeg, one of the most popular writers of the era and also the 
president of the Revisionist League in Hungary, was the first to argue for 
the abstentions in the Pesti HÌrlap (Newspaper of Pest).65 In his writing he 
addressed foreign countries, so the paper was also published in several lan-
 
61 OL K»M K1001936. 
62 DI²SZEGI ISTV N, A hatalmi politika mÀsfÈl ÈvszÀzada (Budapest 1997), 385. 
63 OL K»M K100 63/47 k.a. and several documents from IHht. 
64 KOMAR KRISZTIAN, HungarianEgyptian Interwar Relations = Etudes sur la rÈgion 
MÈditerranÈenne, vol. XII (Szeged 2003), 7583. 
65 Ferenc Herczeg (18631954) one of the most famous Hungarian playwrites and au-
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guages and was distributed in the larger cities of Europe. Herczeg tried to 
support the Hungarian decision in Geneva with moral arguments, using his 
writing skills as a prolific author: 
We think that it is necessary for us to throw some light on the rea-
sons which have forced Hungary to take this and no other decision. 
We will begin with a statement that the political outlook of the Hun-
garian nation has for many years been directed by a desire for the al-
teration of the Peace Treaty of Trianon. This is an aim, which is 
shared both by the government and by every Hungarian citizen. 
Hungarians are chiefly interested in world events from the point of 
view of whether they forward or retard these national aims. There-
fore it is natural that this Italian߃Abyssinian conflict should also be 
regarded from this angle. [ߑ]  
 Until now there has been only one Great Power whose government 
has openly and solemnly taken up as one of its national aims the repara-
tion of injustices inflicted on Hungary. The nations, in sad periods of 
their history, are susceptible to declarations of sympathy and it is quite 
natural that the brave and noble stand taken by the Italian Government 
has linked Hungary to Italy with ties of gratitude and affection.  
 When Hungary took up her attitude in Geneva with regard to sanc-
tions she had no free choice but was obliged to take her place by the 
side of Italy. She was prompted by the voice of her own conscience 
and acted in accordance with the unanimous sentiment of the whole 
Hungarian nation. It is morally impossible to desire sanctions against 
the only state, which has taken as its aim the liberation of Hungary 
from her unbearable situation.  
 This is the real reason for Hungary߈s attitude at Geneva. The eco-
nomic considerations raised at Geneva, compared with these moral 
reasons, are unimportant.66 
After the publication of this article, the reactions of foreign states were 
reported on regularly in the Pesti HÌrlap. From these we know that some-
times the article made things even worse and evoked just the opposite feel-
ing. Western public opinion (and mainly that of the left) was not sensitive 
to such emotional politics and did not really understand the connection 
between the question of the sanctions and Hungarian revisionism, though 
from the aspect of Hungarian foreign policy it made sense.67 However, Hun-
 
66 HERCZEG FERENC, MagyarorszÀg Genfben = Pesti HÌrlap, October 15, 1935 and off-
prints in French, Italian and English. 
67 The French and the British were also in an embarassing situation since they had signed 
an agreement with Italy at Stresa in the same year, in April. The reporter of the Pesti 
BalÀzs SzÈlinger 
Aethiopica 11 (2008) 104
gary was quite embarrassed by the reluctant decision over the question of 
the sanctions; it was still a fact that one of the victorious countries of the 
Great War, which had good relations with Hungary, had started the rear-
rangement. From the Hungarian point of view, this was one of the illusory 
messages of the war, which was also confirmed in the quoted statement of 
Mussolini: ߋwilly߃nilly, Europe should find other healthy roads to walk 
onߌ. 
In the Hungarian Parliament the question arose twice, apart from DezsÕ 
Rupert߈s undelivered but scheduled interpellation in the Hungarian Parlia-
ment.68 Count MÒric EsterhÀzy, former Prime Minister, was the first to rise 
to speak the next day after the publication of Herczeg߈s article. He said: 
I entirely share the point of view that foreign questions should be 
thrashed out before the Committee of Foreign Affairs69, >but@ I think 
that there are questions and situations when this committee is not the 
forum before which official statements should be brought. >ߑ@ In my 
modest opinion, the natural conclusions of the Italian߃Abyssinian 
conflict and the future economic and international conclusions of 
these make it a question of life or death for Hungary. Our govern-
ment should analyze our economic, political and geographical situa-
tion and avoid every statement, step and attitude in order not to  
bring disadvantage on Hungary.70 
The left wing, of course, fully agreed with him, though EsterhÀzy, was not 
the typical representative of this side. KÀlmÀn KÀnya, the minister of foreign 
 
HÌrlap, for example, wrote the following from Geneva: ߋthe reporters of the leftist pa-
pers had talked to me as if the disappearance of the whole right wing would depend on 
the Hungarian decision at Geneva. They are so biased in their political views that they 
did not even want to read Ferenc Herczeg߈s article. The reporters of the right, howev-
er, were pleased to hear about the Italian friendly standpoint and they only objected 
because of the linking of this attitude with Hungarian revision.ߌ TAM S ANDR S, 
Herczeg Ferenc cikke Genfben = Pesti HÌrlap, October 22nd, 1935. 
68 The interpellation of DezsÕ Rupert (summarized in five points) would probably have 
been the bravest defence of Hungarian sanction politics since it refuted the Italian pol-
itics of expansion and the Hungarian standpoint in the question of the sanctions. This 
case informs us that the media tried to be gleichgeschaltet concerning Ethiopia, which 
was obviously successful. Under unknown circumstances the government managed to 
hinder the speech of Rupert. PRITZ (1982) 237238. 
69 Between the two World Wars, questions on foreign policy were not debated openly in 
the Hungarian Parliament, nor in the Committee of Foreign Affairs. Foreign policy 
matters were discussed usually between only the Prime Minister, the Minister of For-
eign Affairs and their secretaries and occasionally the governor. PRITZ (1995) 225233. 
70 Az OrszÀggyÛlÈs kÈpviselÕhÀzi naplÒja, 1935, Vol 3, pp. 302304. 
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affairs, in his answer, made clear that foreign questions were still not to be 
debated publicly with the representatives. In the last part of the answer he 
emphasized the friendly relationship with Italy because of ߋserious rational 
reasonsߌ, which probably meant economic arguments. Finally, he expressed 
his hope that ߋthey will manage to protect Europe from further complica-
tions.ߌ71 EsterhÀzy thanked and acknowledged the answer. 
It seems that the Hungarian policy makers were quite narrow-minded 
and too careful which is also supported by the fact that in 1935 it was im-
possible to debate foreign affairs in the Hungarian parliament. KÀroly Peyer 
(leader of the social democrats), who was the second to rise to speak in the 
dilemma over sanctions, also mentioned this problem. He was anxious 
mostly because of the foreign press, which ߋrepresented the Hungarian 
nation as an uncultured, inferior nation, which does not want to fulfil its 
international duties.ߌ72 Because of this, he claimed it gave the right to each 
of the parties to state publicly their opinion in parliament. He also criticised 
the Prime Minister for a speech, held a few days before, in which GÕmbÕs 
accused the League of Nations of not being impartial. In Peyer߈s opinion it 
was inadvisable to say such things because they could turn the pro-
Hungarian part of British public opinion against Hungary.73 He was the 
only person to question publicly the Hungarian decision in Geneva when  
in his speech he qualified it as ߋnot a really suitable viewpoint.ߌ  
A few days later Count IstvÀn Bethlen, the former Prime Minister and 
one of the most outstanding politicians of the era, went public after a long 
period of silence. His opinion deserves attention from many aspects. On the 
one hand, the Hungarian߃Italian Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1927, 
during his ten-year prime ministry (19211931) and his principles provided 
the basis of Hungarian foreign policy during GÕmbÕs߈s leadership, too. On 
the other hand, from the middle of the thirties on, he was the one who fa-
voured British orientation for Hungary. Furthermore, Bethlen was the best 
known Hungarian politician abroad (perhaps apart from Horthy) and,  
naturally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of this fact. Thus it is 
not surprising that various diplomatic issues were often given to him, al-
 
71 Ibid. 
72 Az OrszÀggyÛlÈs kÈpviselÕhÀzi naplÒja, vol. 3 (1935), 387388. 
73 Peyer߈s fears were right since the problem of those countries which abstained from the 
sanctions arose in the British House of Commons three times and also Attlee, the fu-
ture Prime Minister mentioned it; Parliament Debates, House of Commons, vol. 305 
(1935), 89, 92, 115. Lord Cranborne told Velics, head of the Hungarian delegation in 
Geneva ߋthat nations which took up such an attitude on this occasion must expect it 
to affect the view of the League towards them in the future.ߌ DBFP document no. 52, 
footnote. 
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though officially he did not belong to the Hungarian diplomatic corps. But 
if only because of his warm feelings towards Britain, it would be a mistake 
to expect a different opinion from him about the Hungarian decision in 
Geneva. The cause of his pronouncement on this matter was probably that 
he might have felt the arguments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and of 
Herczeg) to be precarious. So he tried to protect the Hungarian standpoint 
from another new point of view.  
As was mentioned earlier, the official statement in Geneva had an eco-
nomic approach and Herczeg tried to argue from the emotional/moral side 
of the decision. In spite of this, Bethlen, who was an expert in international 
law and also the system of the League of Nations, approached the question 
from the political side. He started with making it clear that the principle of 
Hungarian foreign policy was the preservation of peace, since according to 
the Trianon Peace Treaty, Hungary had no army at that time. He main-
tained that the Covenant of the League of Nations was based on three prin-
ciples: (1) respecting the sovereignty of all the states, (2) general and pro-
portional disarmament and (3) the revision of those ߋtreaties, which have 
become inapplicableߌ.74  
This last expression refers to Article 19 of the Covenant, which would ena-
ble the peaceful arrangement of borders and, because of this, meant hope for 
Hungarian revisionist claims. As the principles state ߃ wrote Bethlen ߃ they 
are worth just as much as their practical use. He also claimed that these prin-
ciples were valid only together because ߋa peace policy of the kind just de-
scribed not only fails to further such a compromise, but actually proves an 
obstacle calculated to delay the materialisation of peace and even to make it 
illusory.ߌ75 Because of this, in Bethlen߈s opinion, the sixteen-year work of the 
League was really dreadful since neither of these principles had been fulfilled. 
Naturally, the ignorance of Article 19 troubles him most: 
The whole world has refused to hear of the possibility of a revision of 
the unjust and intolerable conditions at present in existence. The great-
est care was shown in avoiding even the determination of the significa-
tion and of the conditions of application of Article 19 and the final 
drafting of the relevant rules of procedure; indeed, those who ߃ like we 
 
74 Bethlen߈s article (ߋHungary and the League of Nationsߌ) was published in the Pesti 
HÌrlap in Hungarian, and later in the monthly Danubian Review (November of 1935) 
along with another article, as an off-print, titled ߋTwo Studiesߌ in early 1936. The 
English version was translated by Dr. Arthur B. Yolland, then professor of English 
literature at the University of Budapest. 
75 STEPHEN BETHLEN, ߋHungary And The League Of Nationsߌ, In: Two Studies (Buda-
pest 1936) 312. 
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Hungarians ߃ presumed merely to mention the Article 19 were exposed 
to direct persecution and open threat; and we are pointed at as being 
unruly elements. >ߑ@ Many provisions of the treaties of peace have ac-
tually been subjected to a revision since they were ratified, ߃ but only 
via facti (in the form of fait accomplis brought about by Germany), 
however as a result of procedure in no single case carried out within the 
League itself under Article 19 of the Covenant, such an issue being suc-
cessfully and carefully avoided for fear of establishing a precedent.76  
Bethlen shared the opinion that the biggest mistake of the League of Na-
tions߈ system was its rigidity because it did not allow any change: ߋthe 
world is not static but is subject to evolution and that a certain scope must 
be given to the play of the dynamic forces, as also that no peace work can be 
lasting which does not rest on elastic foundations.ߌ According to Bethlen, 
without the involvement of the defeated countries, the victorious states  
ߋset to work, to the exclusion of the defeated countries, to make so-called  
߇mutual assistance߈ agreements with one another, [however] these agree-
ments being in reality nothing more or less then the old defensible alliances 
in a League of Nations dress.ߌ77 On the other hand, he found a deficiency  
in the question of the sanctions with which he tried to protect Italy and 
Hungary. Namely, Article 15 of the Covenant says that the decision of the 
Council of the League is obligatory only if all the members have accepted it. 
In the case of a simple majority the members could keep their freedom in 
the decision-making, which, in Bethlen߈s interpretation, could mean, ߋthey 
may even go to war.ߌ78 One part of his article focused specifically on the 
abstentions of Hungary from the sanctions: 
Little Hungary79 ߃ one of the defeated States ߃ in her passive struggle 
against the Danube Pact, proposed by the Little Entente and against 
the system of collective ߋsanctionsߌ, was not guided by any hidden 
intention of preparing for some warlike adventure; what really un-
derlay her action was the simple, logical consideration, that if in a 
 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 To see it clearly, we have to lay the fact that the guilt of Italy was not unambiguous 
for an outsider and it was proved only after the Second World War. The cause of this 
was that many people believed in Ethiopia߈s increased potentials and they were afraid 
of a possible attack against the Italian colonies. It is a fact, however, that Ethiopia was 
looking for an exit to the Red Sea and to get it they were satisfied with the argumenta-
tion that Italy only prevents the Ethiopian aggression ߄ thus they act in the name of 
the preservation of peace.  
79 An often used word to name the Hungarian state after the Trianon Peace Treaty. 
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treaty undertaken voluntarily she acknowledged and guaranteed her 
neighbours the frontiers allotted them in the Treaty of Trianon, she 
would be once for all renouncing all claims to have those frontiers 
changed by peaceful means too, while by spontaneously consenting 
to the securing of the status quo by all and every conceivable means, 
she would herself voluntarily remove from the minds of the parties 
on the other side the last psychological cause calculated to persuade 
them at any time to consent to the putting into practice of Article 19 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. [ߑ] No nation in the 
world would be prepared to deny itself or its conviction to that ex-
tent. Should any Government decide to take a step of the kind, the 
indignation of the public opinion of the country would immediately 
sweep it out of existence. Or, a Government making promises to that 
effect for the future would be acting in all faith, giving undertakings 
which it knew it would be unable in any given case to fulfil.80 
These words adhere to such sharp logic that it is worthless adding any-
thing else to them. However, it is not pointless to ponder the question 
whether Hungary could have had any possibility for a compromise, which 
would enable the country to maintain the claim for changing the status quo 
without rejecting participation in the sanctions. In my opinion the answer 
to this question is an unequivocal no and the reasons for this can be found 
in the argumentation of Bethlen߈s articles and in Velics߈s speech in Geneva. 
The last part of Bethlen߈s article, subtitled ߋPeace politics heading for warߌ 
claims that to maintain the peace, Article 19 should be used, i.e. the peace 
treaties should be revised at last: 
The idea of collective security is inseparable from the possibility of a 
revision based upon Article 19 of the Covenant [ߑ] If that is done 
Hungary will undoubtedly be the foremost champion of the idea of 
collective security [ߑ] until the situation changes, it is of vital interest 
to Hungary that she should reserve her liberty in respect of all and 
every kind of collective ߍsanctionߌ [ߑ] Such a peace policy must 
sooner or later lead to bloody conflicts and to war.81 
What we should add to this is the fact if Hungary had given her ߇yes߈ vote 
at Geneva not only would she have lost her most significant market but also 
her only ally. In that case the total political isolation of Hungary would 
have been induced as it was before 1927. It is obvious that loyalty to the 
League of Nations was not worth so much in 1935. 
 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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4. The End of the Conflict 
In December 1935 the Hungarian general staff was ready with its regular 
annual summary of the military situation of the country. The memorandum 
pointed to the most significant international events of the year such as the 
regicide in Marseille, the re-armament of Germany and the Italo߃Ethiopian 
conflict. Concerning the latter the document claimed that: 
The further consequences of these events cannot be seen yet, how-
ever, we can state that they have brought important changes both in 
the politics of Europe and of the world:  
1. That stability which was thought to be unshakable and which was 
a typical feature of the European political situation maintained by the 
absolute power of the victorious states, is now disappearing.  
2. The politics of the League of Nations is at a critical period and so is 
the principle of so-called ߇collective securitÈ߈, too.  
3. Political alliances reappear again, though still within the dress of 
the League of Nations.  
4. The states of Europe ߃ mostly without exception ߃ have become 
the participants in a powerful competition for armament.  
>ߑ@ Since the revisionist powers now have an increasing potential for 
war, it can easily take place an occasion, which serves with the hope 
of success from any reason, would lead to the military solution of the 
question.82 
In Chapter V, titled ߇The Politics of the Revisionist Group߈ the memoran-
dum deals with Germany which ߋhas increased her international impor-
tance with the immense organization of her inner resources and also with 
such successful steps in foreign policy [ߑ] Germany is on the right track to 
become a leading European state again >ߑ@ It could be crucial for the future 
of Hungary to realize and analyse German ambitions and goals.ߌ The gen-
eral staff, however, was not really content with the idea of Germany߈s rising 
again since as they wrote ߋthe vicinity of the German empire with 70 mil-
lion people is not desirable for usߌ, refering to the Anschluss. And further-
more: ߋAt the moment German connections are irreconcilable with Hun-
garian߃Italian friendship. >ߑ@ A German alliance >ߑ@ also means that we 
want to reach our political goals with the use of military forces. This fact 
does not mean either advantage, or disadvantage regarding our present posi-
tionߌ.83 
 
82 IHht 348359. 
83 Ibid. 
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The interpretation of these lines is not easy. In my opinion the document 
was worded intentionally opaquely by the military leaders. Whatever they 
wanted to disclose, it can be surely stated that the question of Hungarian 
revision and the foreign policy of the country got into a desperate situation; 
Italy was confronted with the League and thus ߋthere is no chance of peace-
ful revision.ߌ84 On the other hand, it is logical that Hungary did not have 
the potential to start a military conflict in her disarmed state. The possible 
alliance with Germany, which would have meant the undertaking of mili-
tary action with the help of the National Socialists, did not promise too 
much since Germany was inclined to support the revisionist claims only 
against Czechoslovakia.85 
As was mentioned earlier, Hungary received strong criticism from the 
countries instituting the sanctions. They started to emphasize the point that 
Hungary was profiting from the economic boycott by seizing better market 
positions in Italy. These accusations were primarily made by the states of 
the Little Entente and Titulescu, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
once claimed: 
While in Romania there is no chance in the future to exchange the 
country߈s timber, corn, animals for Italian products, Italy is going to 
buy these goods in Hungary and Austria as both countries are going 
to receive Italian goods. Once more, Romania has decided to fulfil 
the relevant points of the Covenant on the part of the United King-
dom and France. However, it should be seen that the system which 
has been set aside will be favourable for both Hungary and Austria, 
who have violated Article 16 of the Covenant. Though Italy will stop 
the import of timber from Yugoslavia, she will be provided by Hun-
gary. Though Italy will cease to receive import of animals from Ro-
mania and Yugoslavia, but Hungary will export them, just like grain, 
as well.86 
The accusations were without any doubt valid. But to be historically cor-
rect it has to be mentioned that almost every country tried to profit from 
the situation. It was clear from the very beginning of the conflict that Italy 
would need extra import of oil. We have information about greatly in-
 
84 Naturally, Mussolini was continuing to feed Hungary with this, moreover he even 
held out the prospect of it. 
85 ORMOS (1998) 157158. 
86 In: SociÈtÈ des Nations, Journal Officiel, SupplÈment SpÈcial, No. 145, 39. Titulescu 
later, in a private conversation with the Italian ambassador to Bucharest fulminated: 
ߋthose pigs [ߑ] forced us to plunge our fingers into the pot de merde [sic!], now let 
them drink all its contentߌ. OL K»M K63 23/41. 93/pol.szÀm. 
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creased oil cargos from Romania and the Soviet Union from the official 
report of the Hungarian minister in Rome in December 1935.87 However, 
the Soviet Union, which was the newest member of the League of Nations, 
was among those countries which were in favour of stricter sanctions 
against Italy.88 To get the full picture of the situation the fact has to be con-
sidered that the sanctions which took effect on November 18th 1935 were 
accepted by the parliaments of the states only later on or were not even 
ratified by them.89 To that extent it was pointless to urge the escalation of 
the sanctions since nobody took them seriously. Thus the spring of 1936 
passed with endless debates in the League while the Italians came closer and 
closer to victory in Ethiopia.  
Thus the so-called ߇oil-sanctions߈ were never brought into effect probably 
because Mussolini would have provoked a war in the Mediterranean and in 
this case, as the Hungarian minister to Rome had initially stated, ߋhe [Musso-
lini] would have been ready to pay for German support.ߌ90 However, the 
Italian leader was always aware of the fact that he could not compete with 
Great Britain on the sea. That is why the old plan of attacking Yugoslavia 
became a focus of interest in the summer of 1936, while Italian operations 
were still going on in Ethiopia. Obviously this plan was only a diversion, 
pretending that Italy was still a great power in Europe.91 But the Hungarian 
Prime Minister GÕmbÕs, who was formerly an unconditional fan of Musso-
lini, decided already at least in March of 1936. Preziosi, Italian minister to 
Vienna wrote to Mussolini on March 16th, 1936, on the occasion of the Aus-
trian statesman߈s visit to the Hungarian capital: ߋGÕmbÕs ߃ although he 
seemed to be still the organizer of a North-South block [i.e. the Axis] ߃ has 
shown such an affection for Germany, that supposedly if he should choose 
between Rome and Berlin, he would obviously choose the latter.ߌ92 
On July 15th all the sanctions were cancelled and the step itself also meant 
the end of the conflict within the League of Nations. However, the legaliza-
 
87 OL K»M K99 132/pol1935. 
88 ORMOS (1969) 389. See MAXIME LITVINOV, Les causes principales de l߈insuccÇs de 
l߈application des Art. 10 et 16 du Covenant de la S.D.N. = Revue de Droit Internatio-
nal (1936), 104112. 
89 There are only five countries that never recognized the annexion of Ethiopia, namely 
the US, the Soviet Union, Mexico, New Zealand and China; CHRISTINE SANDFORD, 
Ethiopia under HailÈ SelassiÈ (London 1946), 103. 
90 ORMOS (1970) 113. 
91 OL K»M K10011VI13. (June 13th, 1936) 
92 Preziosi, Italian minister in Vienna, to Mussolini. 1936. mÀrcius 19. PChM 371. It is 
clear from this document that if the BerlinRome axis had not come into existence, 
Hungary would have chosen Germany. 
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tion of Italian expansion failed to come about because of the Emperor, who 
claimed (and he could even prove it) that there were still troops fighting in his 
country and even the Ethiopian government was functioning.93 After the sur-
render of the Ethiopian executive power, Hungary and Austria were the first 
to recognize the new Italian Empire in Africa. They did so, however, after 
they had obtained leaked information from the Swiss government that the 
Council intended to come to the same decision.94 Though HailÈ SelassiÈ offi-
cially protested before the League, the decision could not be stopped.95  
Another observation can be drawn from the war between Italy and Ethi-
opia: the poor quality of Italian military equipment. In the first half of the 
thirties Italy had a reputation for being a great air power. Not only were her 
aeroplanes known worldwide but also the skills of her pilots. The first ex-
periment of the Italian air force in action was in Ethiopia. Though the Ital-
ian authorities tried everything to keep outsiders away from the military 
operations, it did not escape the attention of analysts that the Italian aero-
planes lacked any improvement and by 1935߃1936 they had become obso-
lete.96 Vittorio Mussolini, the dictator߈s younger son, who fought in Ethio-
pia as a pilot, was enthusiastic about the Italian planes. However, he men-
tions in his account that the Italian airplanes were very often shot down by 
simple rifles; moreover, it happened many times that the Ethiopians man-
aged to shoot even the pilots themselves from the mountain tops.97 
The performance of the Italian airplanes did not convince the Hungarian 
generals either, who had ordered 26 Italian made planes before the start of 
the war in 1935. The deadline for the delivery was put off again and again 
because of the war and finally, the Hungarians lost patience and decided to 
order new planes but this time modernized German ones.98 The weakness 
of the Italian military forces was an open secret in Hungarian military cir-
 
93 This statement was true. The final regular troops and the general headquarters of the 
Ethiopian government were eradicated up only in the end of 1936 and the beginning 
of 1937. The guerilla warfare, however, carried on and needed about 100 thousand 
Italian soldiers; HAROLD G. MARCUS, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley  Los Angeles 
߃ London 1994) 147152 and SANDFORD 88105. 
94 SANDFORD 99. 
95 The pressmark of the objection is MOL OL K»M K1071936 XX/1. 
96 The bibliography regards the Spanish civil war the event when the obsolescence of 
Italian equipment had been realized all around the world. In my opinion, however, 
this could have already been seen in Ethiopia and Spain and just confirmed it. KEN-
NEDY 278. 
97 Mussolini n.d. In the book there can be seen a picture of one of the planes used in 
action, riddled with bullets.  
98 CSIMA J NOS, OlaszorszÀg szerepe a Horthy-hadsereg fegyverkezÈsÈben, 1920߃1941 = 
HadtÕrtÈneti KÕzlemÈnyek, vol. 2 (1969), 289߃313. 
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cles, since they had firsthand information. Colonel JÒzsef NÈmeth was sent 
to the Ethiopian front as a military observer, and he spent a month there 
along with his Albanian, Japanese, Austrian and American colleagues. His 
return to Hungary happened under scandalous circumstances, because his 
reports sent to Hungary were intolerable to the Italians, who asked the 
Hungarian government to recall the colonel.99 But the scandal continued. 
Once returned to Budapest, colonel NÈmeth gave an exclusive lecture at the 
Hungarian National Military Officers߈ Club, and spoke openly about his 
experiences. However the details of the lecture were leaked to Italian dip-
lomatic ears. There was nothing to do other than to ask the colonel to write 
a long and pro-Italian article for the Hungarian Military Review about the 
ߋglorious victory of Fascismߌ, which he did.100 
5. Conclusion 
Some Hungarian historians (especially before 1990, but sometimes even 
today) tend to consider Hungary as an ߋab ovoߌ ally of Nazi Germany. But 
Hungary was in a disarmed position due to the Trianon Treaty, and in con-
sequence she was looking for a peaceful way of revision. Italy seemed to be 
a solution: as a victorious great power of World War I, potentially and 
sometimes actually, Italy could promote Hungarian aims on the interna-
tional field: at the League of Nations. This Hungarian conception was top-
pled by the Italo߃Ethiopian conflict. The trepidity of Hungarian foreign 
policy shows unambiguously that the Hungarians tried to find a way out of 
this deadlock. However, they could not decide well: with their abstention 
they provoked the sanctionist states and even Italy, as a belligerent country, 
could not tolerate the peaceful Hungarian ambitions.  
During the conflict it became clear that if Italy spent too much time in 
Africa, she would not be able to prevent the Anschluss. If so, Hitler would 
expand German power towards Central Europe. As a consequence, thanks 
to the Italo߃Ethiopian conflict, Germany and Italy made up to each other, 
which was the dream of some Hungarian politicians. But their vision was 
good relations between two equal powers: the Hungarian Prime Minister of 
this era, GÕmbÕs, would have liked to get the support of Italy and Ger-
many together, in equal balance. Although the ߋAxisߌ was realised, the Af-
 
 99 Antal IstvÀn sajtÒfÕnÕk emlÈkiratai. In: R¨TI (1998) 424߃425. 
100 See about the scandal K D R GYULA, A LudovikÀtÒl SopronkÕhidÀig (Budapest 1978), 
278߃279. The colonel߈s article: N¨METH J²ZSEF, Az olasz߃abesszÌn hÀborÙ = Magyar 
Katonai Szemle, vol. 6 (1936), 1߃230. I assumed that there would be a hand-written ver-
sion of the colonel߈s report, but unfortunately there is nothing about this matter in the 
Hungarian Military Archives (I am thankful to archivist Lenkefi Ferenc). 
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rican war resulted in an unequal alliance: Italy (at least in Central Europe) 
ceased to be a great power. This consequence was disastrous for Hungary: 
due to Mussolini߈s African war Hungary fell into Hitler߈s sphere of interest, 
not only economically but politically too. 
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Summary 
Between the two World Wars the main policy of Hungarian diplomacy was the possible 
revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty. Until 1935 they believed in a peaceful way under 
the aegis of the League of Nations with the help of Italy. The ItaloEthiopian conflict, 
however, totally disrupted these plans. Although the Hungarian political elite tried to 
stand by Mussolini, their abstention from the sanctions indicated a changed direction 
toward Germany and militarism. This study, using unpublished Hungarian archival 
sources, reveals the inner struggles of the desperate Hungarian government. 
